In this paper, we apply the theory of rational expectation bubbles proposed by Blanchard and Watson (1983) to the Chinese housing market. The theory implies that negative returns on house prices are less likely to occur if the bubbles exist. Based on data from 35 cities in China, we find no evidence to support the existence of such bubbles in the Chinese housing market.
Introduction
Over the past twenty years, housing prices in China have risen rapidly. From 2003 to 2007, the rates of price increase reached as high as 14 percent per year, on average. Some cities, such as Beijing, reported an annual increase of 22 percent. If we include rental income and capital income, then the return on housing capital exceeds that for business sectors, 1 which raises grave concerns regarding the possible existence of price bubbles.
This is a major concern for policymakers in China as a bubble burst would have serious consequences for China's economy. Thus, it is important to determine whether housing price bubbles actually exist in China.
Most related literature tests for house price bubbles by comparing the present value of houses with housing market prices. The main debate in the literature concerns how to calculate present value. A popular method is to discount future cash flows (rental income), but this approach is not reliable. Future rental income in China is difficult to predict because rental income is affected by economic variables such as GDP, population density, etc., that continue to change over time. Furthermore, it is difficult to choose an appropriate discount rate for housing assets.
Some researchers consider that house price increases should be explained by changes in economic fundamentals, such as income, construction costs, population and interest rates.
House price bubbles are defined as deviations from those fundamentals. For example, Mikhed and Zemcik (2009) suggest that the oversized house price increases in the US between 1997 and 2006 cannot be explained by changes in these fundamentals. This is in contrast with McCarthy and Peach (2004) who at the time of their publication, found no bubble in the US housing market and that changes in house prices reflected movements 1 Xin et al. (2007) estimate the average return rate of the listed companies in Chinese stock markets. They show that the average return rate is around 2.6 percent. CCER (2007) show that capital returns in China have been increasing since 1998. The capital return of state-owned companies between 2003 to 2006 is 8 percent, on average, while the capital return of the private sector is 17 percent for the same period. Because private companies are financially constrained, the high return can be explained by the insufficiency of their capital. The literature, such as Cagetti and Nardi (2006) , has shown that when financially constrained, companies have higher capital returns in equilibrium.
in the fundamentals, such as income and interest rates.
2 However, this approach depends heavily on the choice of economic fundamentals with the results being quite sensitive to the perspective from which these fundamentals are considered.
As for the housing market in China, many researchers set up demand and supply functions for housing and use the equilibrium conditions of efficient markets to test for house price bubbles, but their definitions of a bubble are vague. Moreover, Montrucchio and Privileggi (2001) and Santos and Woodford (1997) , among others, have already proved that rational expectation bubbles are marginal and fragile in the general equilibrium of efficient markets. Hence, solid theoretical support does not exist for applying the equilibrium model of efficient markets to this area.
In this paper, we provide a new method to test for the existence of rational expectation bubbles in China's housing market. The bubbles we test were first proposed by Blanchard and Watson (1983) . We call this kind of bubble a rational expectation growing bubble (hereafter growing bubbles) because they grow until they burst and then commence growing again. These bubbles grow because their returns must be comparative to the average returns of other assets. Growing bubbles are characterized by asset prices that continue to grow over time and returns that surpass the average capital return in the economy.
These features match the dynamic path of China's house prices quite well over the past ten years.
There are two important assumptions in the classical model of growing bubbles we test:
representative agents and complete financial markets. In the literature, other theories of rational bubbles are examined by relaxing these assumptions. For example, Burnside et al. (2011) derive the boom-bust cycle of house price bubbles based on the assumption of heterogeneous beliefs. When people hold different beliefs about future returns, they make different evaluations about the fundamentals of assets. Through the social interactions of rational agents, house prices may experience the dynamic process of rises and falls in the equilibrium. In addition, Kiyotaki and Moore (2004) explore how bubbles function in incomplete financial markets. In these markets, firms have borrowing constraints against their future flow of profits and liquidity constraints against their capital holdings. Hence they choose to save in the forms of liquid assets in order to fund possible future demand for investment. Recent literature, such as Kocherlakota (2009) and Wang and Wen (2009), concludes that in incomplete financial markets, bubbles can exist as a form of liquid asset at one of the equilibria. Although the literature covers many theoretical models on asset price bubbles, our work only focuses on the growing bubbles as defined in Blanchard and Watson (1983) . We shed some light on whether the modeling of bubbles in the classical theories can explain China's housing market.
Unlike most literature studying China's housing market, such as Dreger and Zhang (2010) , Han (2010) and Wang et al. (2011) , this paper tests for the existence of growing bubbles by adopting the method in McQueen and Thorley (1994) , which was originally proposed to find stock market bubbles. Because the theory of rational expectation bubbles proposed by Blanchard and Watson (1983) can be applied to any risky asset and McQueen and Thorley (1994) derive their method based on this theory, their method can also be applied to house prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply this method to the housing market. However, their method cannot be implemented directly.
In the empirical analysis, we find that annual data only exists for eleven years, which is too short to conduct the same application of time series as in McQueen and Thorley (1994) . This limitation also makes it difficult to apply any method dealing with time series such as cointegration or unit root tests, as applied in Mikhed and Zemcik (2009) .
We circumvent this problem by extending their method into the panel data analysis for metropolitan areas since house returns in those areas are highly correlated. 3 This bypasses arbitrary estimation of fundamental house values and does not require theoretical support 3 We conduct the cross-section correlation test with the null hypothesis that all house returns are uncorrelated against the alternative that the correlation is nonzero for some of them. We use the statistic in Frees (1995) and find that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent significance level.
for bubbles in the equilibrium of efficient markets. The basis of our methodology is that the existence of growing bubbles implies that negative returns on house prices are less likely to occur. However, based on data from thirty-five cities in China, we find that the hazard rate of positive returns is not a decreasing function of duration. This suggests that there are no growing bubbles in the housing market of China.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the model used to test for house price bubbles. In Section 3, we illustrate the empirical results, and Section 4 provides our conclusion. Blanchard and Watson (1983) propose a definition of rational expectation bubbles based on a simple efficient market condition, which states that the expected return of a house purchase is equal to the required return:
Model

Theoretical Model
Here E t denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at time t. We denote r t as the required return on this asset at period t. The return of owning a house from period t to period t+1 is R t+1 satisfying
Here p * t and p * t+1 are the unobservable true values of housing at periods t and t+1. We say d t+1 is the rental income of the house at period t + 1. By holding a house from period t to period t + 1, the investor has two sources of revenue: the capital gain from the variation in house prices and the rental income. After some rearrangement, the condition for a competitive equilibrium is equivalent to
Through iteration, we define the fundamental value of a house as
We assume market house prices, p t , contain two components: the true value and the bubble, as shown by p t = p * t + b t . Here b t is denoted as the bubble. As long as b t satisfies
Condition (1) will hold for the market price. This suggests that market price can deviate from the fundamental value by a rational speculative bubble factor, b t . Equation (3) is the necessary condition for bubbles to exist in the competitive equilibrium. It implies that as long as b t grows over time and provides the required return of r t , the agents in the economy would like to hold houses with price bubbles.
Following McQueen and Thorley (1994) , we use t+1 to define the unexpected price changes of the house. Since p t+1 = p * t+1 + b t+1 , both the unexpected changes in the true value and the unexpected changes in b t+1 can affect t+1 . We can write t+1 = µ t+1 + η t+1 , where µ t+1 and η t+1 are the unexpected changes for the true value and the bubble, respectively. The unexpected change in the true value is defined by
We also define the unexpected change in the bubble as
We assume that µ t+1 satisfies a symmetric distribution with mean 0. We assume symmetry because the true value is believed to have the mean-reversion property. In addition, we assume that b t follows a two-point discrete distribution. The bubble component of b t , with probability π, persists in the house price for the following period. Alternatively, b t bursts with a probability of 1 − π with the remainder designated as a 0 . In order for the equilibrium condition (Equation (3)) to hold, b t+1 must satisfy the following condition:
a 0 with probability π a 0 with probability 1 − π .
Here, we assume π > 1−π, which implies π > 1/2. This is reasonable because, empirically, the probability for a bubble to burst is smaller than for it to persist, no matter what the underlying asset is. We can observe this from stock markets and housing markets around the world. Furthermore, intuitively
This means if the bubble persists, its realized value is larger than its value when it bursts.
By substituting η t+1 with Equation (4), we
Equation (6) shows that if the bubble component persists from period t to period t + 1, the expected abnormal return is
and hence positive. If the bubble component bursts, the expected abnormal return is −(1 + r t+1 )b t + a 0 which must be negative because the efficient market condition requires that the expected value of abnormal return is zero. As the possibility of bubbles persisting is higher than that of bursting, the probability of observing negative abnormal returns will be smaller than 1/2 and decrease with b t if the bubbles exist. On the contrary, if the price does not contain bubbles, the probability of observing negative abnormal returns should be equal to 1/2.
So when we observe a sequence of positive abnormal returns, with large probability this means that the bubble component persists and accumulates over time.
We define the probability of observing the negative abnormal return as
which can be expressed as
Here F (·) is the cumulative density function of unexpected changes in the fundamental value µ t+1 . Let us look at the first-order partial derivative of λ t+1 with respect to b t ,
Since π > 1/2 and f is symmetric around 0, Usually, we care more about rates of returns. If the rate of abnormal return is
. Equally, this can apply to the rate of abnormal return, namely
The theoretical model demonstrates that the bubble component leads to a smaller probability of observing negative abnormal return rates of assets as it persists, grows and continuously bears positive abnormal return rates. Therefore, we have the necessary condition for the existence of bubbles: the probability of negative abnormal return rates decreases with the number of periods where the positive rates of abnormal returns are observed. If we use h(T ) to denote the hazard rate of positive abnormal return rates and T to denote the number of periods of positive abnormal return rates (or run length), then the necessary condition for bubbles to exist is
where h(T ) = Prob(e t < 0|e t−1 > 0, e t−2 > 0, · · · , e t−T > 0, e t−T −1 < 0).
Model Implementation
McQueen and Thorley (1994) apply Equation (7) to test for bubbles in the US stock market. They use the monthly returns of portfolios (equally weighted or value-weighted) of all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks from 1927 to 1991. They compute the time series of unexpected returns and hence, the hazard rates, h(T ), under the assumption that an abnormal return is independent and identically distributed (i.e., i.i.d.) over time.
Then, they test whether or not h(T ) satisfies Equation (7).
However, this method cannot work in the housing market of China. China started the marketization of residential real estate in the middle of the 1990s, and therefore, there are no more than 15 data points in the time series of house prices and rental income at annual frequency. Small samples generate large errors when computing hazard rates. So, to alleviate this problem, we use the panel data of thirty-five cities.
We compute the rate of real house return of city i at period t as
where p i t denotes the price in city i at time t and d i t denotes the rental income. We then compute the rate of unexpected returns where unexpected return is the difference between the actual return and the expected return. Hence, if we denote e i t as the rate of unexpected return of city i at period t, then we have
capture the effects of expected income growth and population growth on expected house price changes. Moreover, the rates of expected returns should also reflect the changes of the social average (or required) discounted rates for future cash flows. The rates of expected returns fluctuate with business cycles: low in peaks and high in troughs. Fama and French (1989) , among others, analyze the effects of macroeconomic variables on the rates of stock returns and find that unemployment rates predict higher future rates of stock returns. Their explanation is that, in economic recessions, people require higher expected return rates for assets to compensate for the risks brought by macroeconomic uncertainty. Here, following Fama and French (1989) , we regard the unemployment rate, unem i t−1 , as a measurement for macroeconomic conditions. As an explanatory variable of the regression, it reveals how macroeconomic risks affect expected returns in the housing market. In addition to these fundamental factors, we also include variables implying the opportunity cost of holding houses. An increase in opportunity cost should lead to a decrease in house prices and generate lower expected returns. The rate rr i t−1 denotes interest rates of one-year bank deposits. The rate sr i t−1 denotes the rates of returns from China's stock market. The former provides the return rates of risk-free assets while the latter provides the return rates of risky and less liquid assets.
After we obtain the rates of unexpected (or abnormal) returns, we count the run lengths of positive rates of abnormal returns of the thirty-five cities and combine them together to estimate the hazard rate. 4 We assume that the hazard rate takes a linearlogistic function as
and we then maximize the log-likelihood function
where N t is the count of completed runs of length t in the sample, and M t and Q t are the count of completed and partial runs of length greater than t. The necessary condition for bubbles to exist is ∂h t ∂t < 0,
implying that β should be negative.
3 Empirical Analysis
Data
We focus on yearly house returns between 1999 and 2009. Appendix A presents all the data used in this paper from thirty-five cities. Figure 1 gives the names and the locations of the thirty-five cities. All of the cities but one are located in the east and central areas of China. This is consistent with the population distribution: around 70 percent of the population is concentrated in these areas, which represents only 30 percent of China's land area. 5 Figures 2 and 3 display the nominal GDP and house prices averaged across all the thirty-five cities. These two figures show that from 1999 to 2009, nominal GDP increased to more than 400 percent and nominal house prices increased to around 300 percent.
As local goods, houses are difficult to trade across different locations. The changes in house prices therefore reflect variations in local fundamental factors and opportunity costs. Hence, we use the CPI of each city instead of national CPI to transform all nominal variables into real variables, 6 including rates of stock returns and one-year deposit rates.
The transformed data, which we use in our empirical analysis, are summarized in Table   1 . By following Breitung (2000), we perform the unit-root test for these variables, one by one, and reject the unit-root hypothesis at the 10 percent significance level for each of them.
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[ Table 1 around here]
Empirical Results
We first analyze the benchmark model specified by Equation (8) . In this experiment, we study four different sets of regressors. Table 2 displays the empirical results of the benchmark models. In the first panel, the first column lists all the variables and the other four columns display the regressors for each model studied. For each variable, the first row indicates the estimators for its coefficients and the second row has its p−value.
[ Table 2 around here]
The estimation results are very interesting. First, the coefficient for the rent-price ratio, rp, is positive and significant at the 10 percent level (thereafter, the significance level is set at 10 percent). The high value of the rent-price ratio implies that cash flow from owning a house is high. Thus, investors are more likely to increase their investment in houses, so house prices will increase in the future, which leads to an increase in capital income from future price changes. Therefore, as expected, our results suggest that the lagged rental-price ratio is positively related to the rate of future house returns.
Second, the coefficient for the growth rate of GDP per capita is only significant in Model I and Model II. Other fundamental factors including population growth rate and unemployment rate are not significant in any model. Regional development in China is unbalanced. The differences in real GDP growth rate (per capita) reflects the differences in the income growth of each city. The unemployment rate reflects macroeconomic risks due to the business cycle and is high when the local economy is in recession; the population growth rate reflects the increase of local consumption demand for houses. However, the empirical results show that these variables do not significantly affect the expected returns on housing assets. One possible explanation is that housing capital can flow freely across the different cities of China so as to completely eliminate the influence of local economic fundamentals.
Third, the coefficients for real deposit rates and real stock returns are significant and negative. According to the theory of asset pricing specified by Equation (2), house prices satisfy
where rf t+j is the risk-free rate, and df t+j is the interest rate compensating the risks of liquidity and price variations. The sum of rf t+j and df t+j is equal to r t+j in Equation (2). Equation (12) shows that house prices decrease with an increase of rf or df . Real deposit rates, rr, are the benchmark for risk-free rates, rf . When real deposit rates suddenly increase, house prices will decrease. A decrease in house prices will reduce house transactions, and hence increase liquidity risk and df . 7 In addition, the difference between rates of real stock returns and real risk-free rates gives the price of risks. An increase in stock returns over risk-free rates shows that the market requires higher compensation for 7 Liquidity risk is the risk that a given asset cannot be traded quickly enough in the market to prevent a loss (or to make the required profit). A large literature, both empirical and theoretical, has shown that house transactions and price increases are significantly positively correlated. This literature includes Stein (1995) and Genesove and Mayer (2001) , among others. When house transactions increase, the time spent on liquidizing house assets decreases and so does the risk brought by variations in house prices. Hence liquidity risks are smaller when house transactions boom.
risks. This implies that the market is more risk averse as it then puts a higher value for df . Hence the increase of these two variables leads to a future decrease of house prices and a decrease in rates of expected house returns.
Our results reveal that Chinese houses are mainly used as investment goods instead of consumption goods, so the opportunity cost of capital becomes the major influencing power. This phenomenon may be explained by the institutional features of Chinese financial markets. China is still in a period of transition; in particular, the nominal deposit rates of Chinese commercial banks have not been liberalized. As they are capped by the government, nominal deposit rates in China adjust very slowly.
8 This leads to negative real deposit rates when volatile inflation is high. As Figure 4 shows, China spent around half of the decade between 2000 to 2011 with negative real deposit rates. This experience reinforces the misconception that negative real deposit rates are persistent. Equation (12) tells us that house prices increase with a decrease in real deposit rates. The extreme case is that house prices may converge to infinity if rf t+j remains negative and df t+j is close to zero, as long as rental income, d t , does not also converge to zero. Hence, after such a long period of negative real deposit rates, house prices in China are expected to be high.
[ Figure 4 around here]
The popular indicators used to measure house price bubbles, including rental/price and income/price ratios, cannot apply to our case because those comparative numbers are derived from developed countries where real risk-free rates are mostly positive. Similarly, Himmelberg et al. (2005) agreed when long-term real interest rates are low, house prices are sensitive to changes in fundamentals; hence these fundamentals cannot be used to determine the existence of bubbles. Lacking safe channels for investment, Chinese people hold houses to protect their wealth from losses due to inflation. For houses, the role of 8 Many papers describe and analyze this special feature of Chinese financial markets including Wang (2001) and Burdekin and Siklos (2008) , among others. Therefore, our paper will not repeat the discussions related to this point. investment therefore dominates that of consumption in China as shown by our empirical results.
The first panel of Table 2 gives us the estimation results. Based on these estimated parameters, we collect the residuals of the regressions, counting the numbers of partial and completed run lengths on thirty-five cities individually. Then we apply MLE to get the estimators for α and β in Equation (9) and Equation (10) . The second panel of Table 2 reports the results of this MLE estimation. Figure 5 displays the estimators of the hazard rates with their 90 percent confidence intervals. The confidence intervals are based on the likelihood ratio test, which ensures that they conform to the zero to one probability space and allows them to be asymmetric.
We see that the estimator for β is positive in all the models. This means the hazard rate increases with duration. In addition, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that β = 0 in any of the four models, so the hazard rate at least does not depend on duration. Neither of these results satisfies the necessary condition for the existence of growing bubbles. Therefore, we conclude that there are no growing bubbles in China's housing market.
[ Figure 5 around here]
Robustness Check
In order to check the robustness of our results, we consider different models and regressions.
Subsamples
We use the subsample of the data of all the cities between 2003 and 2007 to analyze the benchmark models described in the previous section. House prices grew most rapidly between 2003 and 2007. Higher growth rates of house prices are supposed to generate higher abnormal returns. Hence this is a period with a high probability of rational expectation growing bubbles. We test this subsample to verify the robustness of our results. The estimation results are summarized in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 around here]
By comparing the coefficients of the regressions with the whole sample, we can see the following differences. The rent-price ratio, rp, is not significant in the subsample. This implies a further deviation of house returns from the economic fundamentals. Second, the coefficient of real risk-free rates is around five times higher in the subsample than for that of the whole sample. Hence predicted house return rates are much more sensitive to real risk-free rates in the subsample. These two points imply that the role of investment in the housing market gets stronger but the role of consumption gets weaker. Finally, the coefficient of stock return is still significant but changes its sign completely, which implies a structural difference between the subsample and the whole sample. However, we can see that the p−values of estimated β are all higher than 10 percent which suggests that the hazard function is not dependent on duration. Hence there is no evidence supporting the existence of growing bubbles in this subperiod. Now we move back to the whole sample between 1999 and 2009, but divide them into two groups based on the average levels of the cities' GDP per capita, and make separate empirical analyses. GDP per capita varies greatly across the provinces of China. In the previous analysis, we did not control for this variable because of its nonstationarity.
Here, we sort the thirty-five cities based on their average GDP per capita from 1999 to 2009 and select the leading 18 cities as the high-GDP city group with the remaining 17 cities as the low-GDP city group. Appendix B displays the names of the cities in each group. Most high-GDP cites are located in coastal areas while low-GDP cities are located in the interior. Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the empirical results. An interesting difference is that the growth rate of GDP per capita is significant and positive for the high-GDP cities in all of the models, but not significant for the low-GDP cities in any of the models. This indicates that expected house returns depend on the growth of the local economy in the rich regions but not in the poor regions. One possible explanation is that the majority of housing assets in the poor regions may be held by people from the rich regions. Furthermore, the second panels of Table 4 and Table 5 show that in all the models for each group, the estimators of β are positive and the hypothesis of β = 0 cannot be rejected. Hence, we are yet to find any evidence to support decreasing hazard rates for each group, implying that there are no rational expectation growing bubbles in the housing market of China (after controlling for the effect of GDP per capita).
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Dynamic Model
Following McQueen and Thorley (1994), we include lagged rates of house returns as explanatory variables in the model and apply the dynamic panel estimation method, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) , to obtain residuals. The regression model is Table 6 displays the results of the regressions. We see that, in all models, the estimated coefficient for the lagged rates of house returns is negative. This implies that as a form of asset, houses are mean-reverting in returns, as are other ordinary assets like stocks.
9
The second panel of Table 6 shows that the estimators of β are insignificant. Therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis that β = 0. The existence of growing bubbles is not supported in this scenario.
[ Table 6 around here]
9 See Fama (1970) and Samuelson (1991) .
Different Measures of Variables
We now consider the potential consequences different measures have on some of the variables. First, we use nominal variables rather than real variables, to replicate the benchmark analyses. Table 7 summarizes the results.
[ Table 7 around here]
Then, we return to the real values of our sample, but we use the GDP deflator instead of CPI to obtain these real values. Table 8 shows the estimating results.
[ Table 8 around here]
We see that the patterns of the hazard functions in these two settings are very similar to those of the original benchmark models. And again, the existence of growing bubbles is not supported even when different measures are used on the variables.
Hazard Rate Functions
All the previous analyses are based on the linear-logistic function of the hazard rate. We try a simple linear function where
We then apply this hazard function to the benchmark models and compare the estimation results with the original results. Table 9 shows this comparison.
[ Table 9 around here]
We find that estimated β is not significant in any of the four models, no matter which hazard function is used. This implies that, for some scenarios, it is difficult to credit the existence of growing bubbles.
In summary, there is no scenario with the necessary condition for growing bubbles to exist, i.e., that the hazard rate decreases with the durations of observed positive rates of abnormal returns. This is in spite of our adjustments to both the models and the data.
This implies that our result is robust and that the data do not support the existence of growing bubbles in the housing market of China.
Conclusion
This paper tests for the existence of rational expectation growing bubbles in China's housing market. We find that house returns in Chinese cities do not satisfy the necessary condition for the existence of such bubbles. We also demonstrate that our result is robust.
This means that attributing the rapid growth of China's house prices to the growing bubbles is inappropriate. In other words, it is misleading to ascribe high house prices to opportunistic purchases aimed at future capital gains brought by the expanding bubble components.
In addition, we also find two interesting results. First, local fundamentals such as the GDP growth rate, unemployment and population growth, cannot significantly affect the local expected returns of houses. As we have discussed previously, house capital flows freely across different regions, and hence eliminates any influence of the local economy on the expected rate of house returns. Cash flow from rich regions becomes the major reason for the high rate of increase in house prices in poor regions. Given the recent rapid rise in house prices, the government is now confronted with pressure to lower the rate of increase of house prices in certain cities and make house prices consistent with income growth. Thus, our result implies that to achieve this, it is necessary to block the free flow of capital between the housing markets of different cities, especially from rich to poor regions. Then you will see expected house returns varying with the local growth rate of income. Policies such as placing restraints on the purchases of houses by non-locals can work in this direction.
Second, real deposit rates significantly negatively affect expected house returns. As the opportunity cost of capital, this variable influences the expectation of house returns mainly through its affect on the expectations of future house prices. It also highlights that, in China's housing market, the role of investment dominates that of consumption. The long-term official control of nominal deposit rates may be responsible for this phenomenon.
Therefore, any policy targeting the elimination of investment demand for Chinese houses should significantly affect the prices of Chinese houses. Also bear in mind that the distortion of China's financial market contributes to this phenomenon, so any future reform or liberalization of the financial market may render the current high prices of Chinese houses unsustainable.
To explore the mechanisms behind the rapid increase of house prices any further, we need to carefully examine demand and supply in China's housing market. China continues to experience extraordinary changes in both income growth and urbanization. We also know that the government is the dominant power in terms of land supply in China. Do these special features of the housing market affect the dynamics of China's house prices?
These questions are left for future research. 
B Cities' Locations
High-GDP Cities: Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Shenyang, Jinan, Urumqi, Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Xiamen, Shenzhen, Hohhot, Wuhan, and Haikou.
Low-GDP Cities: Xining, Chongqing, Nanning, Guiyang, Hefei, Yinchuan, Xi'an, Lanzhou, Nanchang, Shijiazhuang, Kunming, Haerbin, Changchun, Chengdu, Changsha, Taiyuan, and Zhengzhou. This is a summary of the estimation results for four different models. The notations follow Table  1 . For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions. Table 1 . For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions. This is a summary of the estimation results for high-GDP cities. The notations follow Table 1 . For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions. This is a summary of the estimation results for low-GDP cities. The notations follow Table 1 . For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions. This is a summary of the estimation results for four dynamic panel models. The notations follow Table 1 . For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions. This is a summary of the estimation results for nominal variables. The notations follow Table 1 . For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions. This is a summary of the estimation results for different data (GDP deflator). The notations follow Table 1 . For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions. This is a summary of the estimation results for the linear function of the hazard rates in the benchmark models. In the first panel, the linear hazard function is employed in the estimation, compared with the linear-logistic hazard function in the second panel.
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Figure 1: Cities and Locations
Here are the locations of the thirty-five cities studied in our paper. They are Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Shenyang, Jinan, Haerbin, Shijiazhuang, Urumqi, Changchun, Haikou, Hohhot, Wuhan, Taiyuan, Chongqing, Changsha, Zhengzhou, Yinchuan, Xining, Nanning, Chengdu, Hefei, Nanchang, Xi'an, Lanzhou, Guiyang, Kunming, Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Ningbo, and Xiamen. This figure shows the hazard rate and 90 percent confidence intervals for runs of unexpected returns in the Chinese housing market. The stars denote the estimated hazard rates and the squares denote the corresponding confidence intervals.
